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Pricing Cases in the Pharmaceutical Sector
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Year Companies Investigated Practice Country Fines
Ongoing Aspen Excessive price increases EU
ongoing Actavis Excessive price increases UK
2016 Flynn / Pfizer Excessive price increases UK £84.2 million
2016 Aspen Excessive price increases Italy €5.2 million
2015 Not Disclosed Loyalty-inducing discount scheme UK None
2014 AstraZeneca Hospital discounts Netherlands None
2013 Schering-Plough / 
Reckitt Benckiser
Fidelity rebates to pharmacies (and 
denigration)
France €15.3 million 
2009 Wyeth / Phadisco Bundling Cyprus €400,000
2007 GlaxoSmithKline Predatory pricing (annulled) France €10 million
2003 Sandoz Bundling France €7.8 million
2003 Genzyme Bundling UK £6.8 million
2001 Napp Hospital discounts and excessive 
community prices
UK £3.2 million
2001 Abbott Exclusivity discounts France ₣2 million
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Excessive Pricing:  The Dilemma
 Excessive pricing is often seen as the quintessential evil of monopoly
 But recognition that high prices create incentives to innovate and invest and 
attract competition to the market.  High prices also encourage companies to 
race to get their products to market first, which benefits patients.
 How do you distinguish between acceptably high prices and excessive 
prices?  
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Legal Test for Excessive Pricing
 Article 102(a) provides that an abuse may consist of “directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices …”
 In United Brands (1978), the Court of Justice said that charging a price which 
is excessive because “it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of 
the product” is abusive.
 Court of Justice set out a 2-pronged test:
1. Whether the difference between the costs and the price is excessive;  and
2. Whether the price is either unfair
a) in itself or
b) when compared to the price of competing products.
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Problems with the Legal Test
 Is difference between price / costs excessive?
 Difficult to determine costs
 What is “excessive”?
 Is the price unfair “in itself”?
 What is “in itself”?
 Is the price unfair when compared to competing products?
 Comparisons difficult
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Difficulties with Applying Test in Pharma Sector
 Which costs?  Most significant costs for drugs are the R&D costs. How do 
you allocate them over time and across countries?
 Costs do not capture all the costs of the high failure rate in bringing a drug to 
market.
 Higher prices may reflect superior efficacy and fewer side effects, which 
reduces long-term costs to national health budgets – need to look at health 
technology assessments.  
 National pricing and reimbursement regimes limit freedom of pharma 
companies in setting prices.
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Addressing Excessive Pricing in Pharma Sector:
Policy Issues
 Competition authorities are generally reluctant to launch cases:
 Application of legal test raises very difficult questions (e.g. what is the correct 
price)
 Interference with pricing could chill innovation in a sector where innovation is 
key – high prices are the carrot that encourages companies to invest in R&D
 Unnecessary in light of the strong buyer power exercised by national health 
authorities and other payors.  Some Member States now considering joint 
buying arrangements.
 Pricing of medicines a national issue for Member States
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Napp (UK)(2001)
 Napp sold sustained release morphine to hospitals at steep discounts and charged 
much higher prices to pharmacies, which the OFT found to be excessive.
 OFT found that the prices charged to pharmacies were above the level that would be 
charged in a competitive market.
 Exclusionary conduct in hospital sector linked to excessive pricing in pharmacy sector
 OFT looked at a range of comparators:
 Prices were between 30 and 50% higher than competitors
 List prices to pharmacies were, in some instances, more than 2000% higher 
than those in hospitals
 Prices to pharmacies were 500% higher than those for export
 Napp’s gross market was over 80%, while it was less than 70% for Napp’s most 
profitable competitor 
 CAT upheld the OFT’s decision. 10
Gilead
 On 22 December 2014, the European Commission declined to open an investigation 
into allegations of excessive prices for Gilead’s hepatitis C drugs, despite pressure 
from members of the European Parliament.  
 Commissioner Vestager responded to the Parliamentary Question (P-008636/2014) as 
follows:
Pursuant to Article 168(7) TFEU, Member States are responsible for health and 
medical care, including the allocation of resources assigned to these areas. Each 
Member State may therefore take measures to regulate or influence the prices in 
these areas. 
For this reason, price-setting by pharmaceutical manufacturers and healthcare 
systems in general takes place on a national level, allowing Member States to 
exercise their bargaining power. … 
Moreover … the market for hepatitis C drugs is a rapidly moving therapeutic 
area, with several new classes of direct-acting antivirals now in advanced stages 
of development. This would seem to suggest that this is a dynamic market.
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Gilead
 On 15 March 2015, Commissioner Vestager responded to a follow-up 
Parliamentary Question (000261/2015) as follows:
Since the Commission's earlier response, as it can be ascertained from 
public sources, the factual situation surrounding this particular medicine 
has evolved further. For example, another novel medicine such as 
AbbVie's Viekira Pak has entered the market to compete with Sovaldi in 
addition to, for example, Janssen's Olysio. Furthermore, several 
Member States have concluded or are negotiating pricing and 




 On 29 September 2016, the Italian competition authority imposed a €5.2 
million fine on Aspen Pharma for abusing its dominant market position by 
charging excessive prices for certain cancer drugs – Aspen increased the 
prices from 250% to 1500%. 
 Authority emphasized the following points in finding an abuse:  
 Aspen business model to buy drugs and exploit market niches by raising prices
 Aspen is a generics company and not engaged in R&D – no investment by 
Aspen to improve quality of the drugs
 Aspen had made efforts to increase the prices in Italy up to the levels in other 
EU countries, in order to limit the levels of parallel trade of the product out of 
Italy.
 Aspen threatened to withdraw the marketing authorization of the product if the 
health authority did not agree to the price increases.  
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Summary Guidance
 High risks arise from drastic price increases after drug is on market:
 UK and Italian cases concern drastic price increases (250% or more)
 Cases involved drugs that were already on the market – easier to bring case as 
a “fair” price (i.e. the price prior to the increase) has already been established –
no need to compare with competing products
 Such risks would not appear to arise in the context of:
 Initial price setting or pricing and reimbursement negotiations with the health 
authority
 Moderate price increases 
14
Overview
I. Overview of Pricing Cases in the Pharmaceutical Sector
II. Excessive Pricing
III. Conditional Rebates & Discounts
15
Conditional Rebates & Discounts
Warning -- A Complicated Topic!
 Low prices are good except when they are bad  
 If a company is dominant, granting conditional rebates or discounts could 
potentially constitute an abuse triggering large fines
 Competition enforcers struggle to strike a balance between allowing 
companies to compete vigorously on price and preventing companies with 
market power from using conditional discounts or rebates to foreclose 
competitors from the market
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Conditional Rebates & Discounts
No clear rules: 
 The Commission promotes an economic approach this is more coherent, but 
hard to apply in practice
 The EU case law sets out formalistic rules that do not sit well with economic 
theory
 The 2014 Intel judgment upheld the Commission’s €1.06 billion fine for 
exclusivity rebates, relying on a form-based legal standard
 The 2015 Post Danmark II judgment rejected the argument that an as-efficient 
competitor test is necessary to find that retroactive rebates violate EU 
competition law
 Can’t ignore the case law because national courts and competition 




 In its Article 102 Guidance Paper, the European Commission sets out an 
analytical framework for the analysis of rebate/discount systems that is 
based on economic theory that can lead to results that are different from the 
rigid, formalistic rules developed in the case law
 The core concept is the “as-efficient-competitor” (AEC) test:  if an equally-
efficient competitor can compete effectively with the pricing conduct of the 
dominant company, the Commission says that it generally will infer that the 
dominant firm’s pricing is unlikely to have an adverse impact on effective 
competition and will be unlikely to intervene
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Intel
 In 2014, the General Court upheld the €1.06 billion fine on Intel for 
exclusivity rebates
 Court defined three categories of rebates:
1) Presumptively lawful – incremental volume rebates that pass on cost savings to 
customers
2) Presumptively unlawful – rebates conditional upon the customer purchasing all 
or most of its requirements from the supplier (“exclusivity” or “fidelity” rebates)
3) Case-by-case assessment – all other rebates or discount schemes
 Intel’s rebates were held to fall into the second category, and thus were held 
to be presumptively unlawful
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Post Danmark II
 Case concerned a retroactive rebate falling into the third Intel category, 
requiring a case-by-case assessment of all of the circumstances
 Court of Justice focused on the retroactive nature of the rebate
 Without any assessment of the actual percentages or volumes at issue, the 
Court
 highlighted the “suction effect” caused by retroactive rebates
 concluded that the rebate at issue produces an anti-competitive 
exclusionary effect (para 42).
 Court’s approach condemns a retroactive rebate structure without any 




Type of Discount 
or Rebate
European Commission EU Courts
Exclusivity Case-by-case (AEC test) Presumptively Illegal
Retroactive Case-by-case (AEC test) Case-by-case
(No need for AEC test)
Incremental Case-by-case (AEC test) Case-by-case
(no specific guidance)
Quantity Presumptively lawful Presumptively lawful
CMA Case Closure
 June 2015, the CMA issued guidance that rebates / discounts are more likely 
to give rise to competition concerns where the rebates or discounts:
 are conditional on the customer obtaining all or most of its requirements from a 
dominant company,
 are retroactive (i.e. only apply if the customer reaches a volume threshold, and 
trigger lower prices on units above and below the threshold), especially if the 
customer may wish to source some (but not all) of its demand from a 
competitor,
 result in below-cost prices for contestable sales (i.e. the sales for which another 
supplier could compete), or
 result in negative incremental pricing (i.e. if the customer purchases more from 
the dominant company, the total price paid by the customer goes down).
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Incremental Rebates
 While incremental rebates bear less risk than exclusivity or retroactive 
rebates, they are not without risk
 Could foreclose competitors, particularly if the incremental discounts are very 
substantial
 Commission’s Article 102 Guidance:
 Necessary to conduct an as-efficient competitor test
 Incremental discounts should not result in anti-competitive foreclosure if 
the net price is above average cost (long run average incremental cost)
 There are few cases on incremental rebates, so no clear legal standard 
established by the EU Courts
 Incremental rebates may also qualify as presumptively lawful quantity 
rebates, if the rebates simply pass cost savings onto the customer
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Additional Issues
 Price-based foreclosure in the pharmaceutical sector is most likely in pricing 
and reimbursement negotiations with payors
 In many countries, doctors are not price sensitive and/or do not know the net 
prices
 Need to assess whether a proposed pricing strategy would unfairly cause a 
payor to limit access of a competitor to the market (e.g. refusing or limiting 
reimbursement)
 Commercial pricing strategies differ significantly in the pharmaceutical sector 
than in other industries
 Payors have fixed annual budgets and yet limited scope to control the volumes 
of products used each year
 Discounts are often necessary to address concerns regarding uncertain level of 
demand – raising a possible objective justification
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Pop Quiz 1
Urgent request for legal approval:
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Critical Question:
 Is the discount 
retroactive?
Risk Assessment:
 If retroactive – higher risk
 If not retroactive – flat 






















 Is the scheme retroactive or 
incremental?
Risk Assessment:
 If retroactive – higher risk –
this is the rebate applied in 
Post Danmark II
 If incremental – need to 
apply as-efficient competitor 
test
Pop Quiz 3
Urgent request for legal approval:
Proposal: We will give them a 15% discount if they increase their 
purchases from last year.
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Critical Question:
 Is the 15% discount retroactive or incremental?
Risk Assessment:
 If retroactive – higher risk
 If incremental – need to apply as-efficient competitor test
Pop Quiz 4
Urgent request for legal approval:
Proposal: The hospital has said that they will buy all of their 
requirements from us if we offer an extra 10% discount
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Risk Assessment:
 Very high risk – exclusivity discount
 The fact that it is requested by the customer is not a valid 
defense
Pop Quiz 5
Urgent request for legal approval:
Proposal: We will give them an extra discount if they purchase 
more than 70% of their requirements from us
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Critical Question:
 Is the extra discount retroactive or incremental?
Risk Assessment:
 If retroactive 
 higher risk 
 May also qualify as an exclusivity rebate
 If incremental – need to apply as-efficient competitor test
Summary Guidance
 Exclusivity rebates or discounts will create very high risks – presumptively 
unlawful
 Retroactive rebates create high risks
 Post Danmark II illustrates that courts or national competition authorities may 
take a very form based-approach, with no or little numerical assessment
 The Article 102 Guidance is only binding on the European Commission, not 
national authorities
 Incremental rebates
 Lower risk than exclusivity or retroactive rebates
 Necessary to apply as-efficient competitor test to evaluate risk of anti-
competitive foreclosure
 Flat pricing without any volume requirements is generally low risk
32
